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THE MODERN ANTITRUST RELEVANCE OF
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
Spencer Weber Waller*
INTRODUCTION
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes played as important a part
in the development of United States antitrust law as he played
in the development of constitutional law for which he enjoys a
reputation as a giant in American law. Yet, for the more than
sixty years since Holmes's retirement, there has been no com-
prehensive analysis of his contributions to the regulation of
competition in this country. Now there are two.
Almost simultaneously, Professor Alfred Neely of the Uni-
versity of Missouri Law School and I have each published
separate articles seeking to unravel whether Holmes had any
substantial philosophy underlying his many opinions in a field
of law that he found both silly and personally repugnant, and
whether Holmes was faithful to his often-articulated view of
the role of judges in upholding and implementing statutes with
which they personally disagreed.1 I now revisit the area of
Holmes and the antitrust laws as Professor Neely and I dis-
agree in the basic conclusions we draw, and to extend my earli-
er analysis to suggest that Holmes has a profound relevance
for modern antitrust policy which Professor Neely overlooks.
Professor Neely reaches two overreaching conclusions, both
of which I challenge. First, although he correctly identifies the
many different jurisprudential and philosophical influences on
Holmes and the different ways Holmes can be read in light of
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., University of
Michigan, 1979; J.D., Northwestern University, 1982. Special thanks to Elizabeth
R. Stern for her research assistance on all of my investigations of Justice Holmes.
' Alfred S. Neely, "A Humbug Based on Economic Ignorance and Incompe-
tence"-Antitrust in the Eyes of Justice Holmes, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1; Spencer We-
ber Waller, The Antitrust Philosophy of Justice Holmes, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 283
(1994).
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those movements,2 Professor Neely ultimately concludes that
Holmes had no coherent philosophy of his own in approaching
antitrust cases.' Professor Neely's second conclusion is that in
his antitrust opinions, Holmes remained faithful to his view
that judges should not impose their personal views on the
constitutionality and interpretation of legislation, but should
implement the wishes of the legislature that drafted the legis-
lation.4 Professor Neely, however, does concede that Holmes
had a somewhat idiosyncratic view of what the legislature
intended to accomplish in drafting the Sherman Act and subse-
quent antitrust legislation.5
Professor Neely further alludes to Holmes's influence on
modern movements in antitrust such as Law and Economics.6
But he fails to analyze critical limitations on the often-asserted
view of Holmes as the father of the Law and Economics move-
ment and overlooks two additional modern movements for
which Holmes can be claimed as a more direct ances-
tor-namely theories of countervailing power usually associat-
ed with John Kenneth Galbraith and the antitrust abolitionists
currently represented by Lester Thurow and others. Professor
Neely incorrectly suggests that Holmes is a marginal historical
figure for antitrust purposes, when in fact his overarching
philosophy, rather than his doctrinal contributions, continues
to animate much of current antitrust debate.
I intend to address three important issues where I dis-
agree with Professor Neely or where he has stopped short, in
order to assess more fully Justice Holmes's contributions to
antitrust law and policy, a body of law that has been hailed as
a charter of economic freedom of nearly constitutional dimen-
sion,7 but one that Holmes viewed with great antagonism:
(1) Did Justice Holmes have a coherent antitrust phi-
losophy?
(2) Can any such philosophy be squared with Holmes's
2 Neely, supra note 1, at 7-22.
3 Id. at 64-65.
4 Id. at 62.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 19-21.
See generally Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958);
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940); Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
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views about deference to legislation? and
(3) What, if any, is Holmes's relevance and legacy for
modern antitrust law and policy?
My conclusions go beyond the mere eclecticism identified
by Professor Neely and suggest that Holmes had a coherent,
but limited, view of antitrust as the federalization of a common
law designed to protect and enhance the value and use of pri-
vate property. Justice Holmes's views, advocated primarily in
dissents and private writings, did not rise to the lofty stan-
dards that he otherwise advocated regarding a judge's duty to
implement personally distasteful legislation.
Despite all this, I believe Justice Holmes remains a figure
of importance and relevance for modern antitrust scholars and
policymakers. While Holmes's views do not survive in antitrust
doctrine, his narrow and negative view of antitrust is reflected
both directly and indirectly in powerful arguments that oppose
the contemporary antitrust mainstream and remain important
forces to be reckoned with in the definition of the future of
antitrust.
I. THE ANTITRUST OPINIONS OF JUSTICE HOLMES
There is no need for a lengthy retelling of the antitrust
opinions of Justice Holmes. Professor Neely has done an admi-
rable job of describing this body of work.' For my purposes, a
discussion of four opinions will suffice to sketch the antitrust
vision of Justice Holmes.
A. Northern Securities Co. v. United States
In Northern Securities Co. v. United States,' Justice
Holmes set forth a comprehensive, but limited, vision of the
antitrust laws which he followed for his thirty years on the
Supreme Court." Holmes dissented from the invalidation of a
railroad consolidation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Holmes operated from the premise that even if every step of
8 Neely, supra note 1, at 23-61; see also Waller, supra note 1, at 286-314.
' 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
'9 Id. at 400. Chief Justice Fuller and Justices White and Peckham joined
Holmes's dissent. Holmes also joined Justice White's dissent, which focused on the
lack of interstate commerce. Id at 364.
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the merger was done "with the single intent of ending competi-
tion between the companies,"1 that competition was "totally
unimportant" to any part of the proper interpretation of the
Sherman Act.'2
Holmes contended that the Sherman Act was not con-
cerned with competition at all, but only prohibited contracts,
combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, as those
terms were understood at common law.1" For Holmes, con-
tracts in restraint of trade consisted of what modern parlance
generally refers to as restrictive covenants in connection with
the sale of a business or the formation of a partnership. Such
contracts were prohibited under certain circumstances at com-
mon law to protect medieval communities from the burden of
supporting persons who had contracted away the right to prac-
tice their livelihood, and only incidentally to protect the com-
munity from the loss of competition." In Holmes's view, the
objections to such contracts had nothing to do with competi-
tion, except in the limited circumstances in which they
amounted to an actual monopoly.1 5
Holmes viewed combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade as agreements to keep third parties out of a business or
trade. Holmes contended that at common law:
The objection to them was not an objection to their effect upon the
parties making the contract, the members of the combination or
firm, but an objection to their intended effect upon strangers to the
firm and their supposed consequent effect upon the public at
large.1
6
Holmes followed the natural implication of his reasoning in
concluding that the Sherman Act did not require that existing
11 Id. at 401.
22 Id.
" Id. at 403-04. For a critique of Holmes's analysis of the common law of
restraints of trade, see WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA
233 (1965).
1 See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (KB. 1711).
1 Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 404.
16 Id. Holmes further relied on the wording of the private right of action given
to persons "injured in [their] business or property" as necessarily meaning outsid-
ers to the combination and not the participants themselves. Id. at 405. Holmes
also addressed in passing his view that § 2 of the Sherman Act did not prohibit
any additional types of behavior, but merely condemned the type of behavior un-
lawful under § 1 if done unilaterally. Id. at 404-05.
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competition be maintained but "simply requires that a party's
freedom in trade between the States shall not be cut down by
contract with a stranger."
17
B. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Holmes applied a similarly narrow view of the antitrust
laws in his dissent in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons.' In Dr. Miles, the plaintiff was a manufacturer of pro-
prietary medicines that were sold through distributors and
retailers who had agreed contractually to maintain certain,
minimum resale prices that they would charge their customers
for the medicines. The Dr. Miles Medical Company ("Dr.
Miles") sought to enjoin a wholesaler outside of its group of
dealers who had obtained the medicine from reselling it for
less than the specified minimum resale price.
The Supreme Court held that Dr. Miles's conduct was
unlawful to the extent that it constituted a restraint on alien-
ation of goods that Dr. Miles had sold rather than con-
signed.' The Court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the pro-
prietary nature of the formula entitled it to control resale pric-
es,20 or that a manufacturer was generally entitled to control
the prices on the sales of its products.2'
In dissent, Holmes characterized Dr. Miles's conduct as
seeking to "restrain the defendant from inducing, by corruption
and fraud, agents of the plaintiff and purchasers from it to
break their contracts not to sell its goods below a certain
price."22 He ridiculed the majority for allowing price condi-
tions to be used in consignment arrangements, but not outright
sales, since the plaintiff could simply restructure its distribu-
tion network and satisfy the concerns of the majority."
Holmes reserved his harshest criticism for the portions of
,7 Id. at 406.
'220 U.S. 373 (1911).
1) Id. at 404.
22 Id. at 402-03; see also Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 501
(1917) (Holmes dissenting against application of exhaustion doctrine in patent
antitrust case involving both resale price maintenance and tying restrictions).
21 Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 406-08.
' Id. at 409.
2 Id. at 411.
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the majority opinion that condemned resale price maintenance
as injurious to competition and consumers. He contended that
the Sherman Act did not apply to such agreements at all, and
that the Court had not set forth any persuasive reasons to
interfere with the principle of letting people manage their
businesses as they see fit.24 He stated:
I think that we greatly exaggerate the value and importance to the
public of competition in the production or distribution of an arti-
cle... as fixing a fair price. What really fixes that is the competi-
tion of conflicting desires. We, none of us, can have as much as we
want of all the things that we want. Therefore, we have to choose.
As soon as the price of something that we want goes above the point
at which we are willing to give up other things to have that, we
cease to buy it and buy something else. Of course, I am speaking of
things that we can get along without. There may be necessaries that
sooner or later must be dealt with like short rations in a shipwreck,
but they are not Dr. Miles's medicines. With regard to things like
the latter it seems to me that the point of most profitable returns
marks the equilibrium of social desires and determines the fair price
in the only sense in which I can find meaning in those words. The
Dr. Miles Medical Company knows better than we do what will
enable it to do the best business.'
He then reiterated his view from Northern Securities that such
a contract should be enforced since it does not exclude any
third parties from a business naturally open to them.26
C. Vegelahn v. Guntner
Holmes wrote one of his most illuminating antitrust opin-
ions while still serving on the Massachusetts Supreme
Court." In Vegelahn v. Guntner," Holmes dissented from
the grant of an injunction against the peaceful picketing of an
employer in a labor dispute. Holmes argued that even if the
defendants' actions would injure the economic interests of the
24 Id.
21 Id. at 412.
2 Id. at 413; see also United States v. A. Schrader's Sons, Inc., 252 U.S. 85,
100 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Boston Store v. American Gramaphone Co.,
246 U.S. 8, 28 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
' For additional discussion of the few relevant state competition cases and
their influence on Holmes's later work on the United States Supreme Court, see
Waller, supra note 1, at 308-12.
28 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896).
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plaintiff, such damage was justified by recourse to "consider-
ations of policy and social advantage."29
Holmes chose as an example the principle that a man was
free to set up a shop in a small town that he knew was only
large enough to support one such establishment, and compete
with a preexisting establishment. Any injury to the incumbent
shopkeeper was justified because 'Tree competition is worth
more to society than it costs.""
Holmes extended this principle to all conflicts of "temporal
interests," including that of labor and management.3 ' Holmes
stated:
[I]t is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or
the most superficial reading of industrial history, that free competi-
tion means combination, and that the organization of the world, now
going on so fast, means an ever increasing might and scope of com-
bination. It seems to me futile to set our faces against this tendency.
Whether beneficial on the whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it is
inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of society, and even the
fundamental conditions of life, are to be changed.
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his ser-
vices, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get
his services for the least possible return. Combination on the one
side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the neces-
sary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a
fair and equal way. 2
D. Swift and Co. v. United States
Holmes's most significant interpretation of Section 2 of the
Shermcn Act came in Swift and Co. v. United States." Swift
is generally cited for the proposition that the offense of at-
tempted monopolization is proved through a showing of a spe-
' Id. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also May v. Wood, 51 N.E. 191, 192
(Mass. 1898) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that competition in trade as justifi-
able cause for economic injury to others).
" Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1077; see also OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 144-45 (1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW]; Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894)
[hereinafter Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent].
21 Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081.
32 Id. at 1081; see also Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900).
196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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cific intent to monopolize and a dangerous probability of suc-
cess, normally demonstrated through proof of a market share
approaching that of monopoly power.14 Swift also provided an
opportunity for Holmes to redefine Section 2 of the Sherman
Act in his own unique, common-law terms.
Professor Neely makes the mistake of other antitrust com-
mentators35 in seeking to view Swift primarily as a case about
antitrust doctrine, and not a case about the meaning of at-
tempt crimes at common law. Swift is best viewed as part of
the continuation of Holmes's reformulation of the law of at-
tempt based on the proximity to dangerous outcomes, rather
than a reliance on intent as the governing standard. As Pro-
fessor Morton Horowitz has noted: "If there is a single, overrid-
ing and repetitive theme running through Holmes's writing, it
is the necessity and desirability of establishing objective rules
of law, that is, general rules that do not take the peculiar men-
tal or moral state of individuals into account."
3 7
The requirement of a dangerous probability of success
cannot be dismissed as unclear prose since Holmes repeatedly
used this phraseology both before and after Swift in discussing
attempted monopolization. In 1904, Holmes stated in Northern
Securities that the defendants' conduct was "too remote" to con-
stitute an offense, and used language that proved to be a trial
run for his later holding in Swift: "There must be a certain
nearness to the result. It is a question of proximity and de-
" See Spectrum Sports, Inc., v. McQuillian, 113 S. Ct. 884, 892 (1993).
3 See Mark E. Roszkowski & Ralph Brubaker, Attempted Monopolization: Re-
uniting a Doctrine Divorced from its Criminal Law Roots and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 355 (1990).
:1 See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 30, at 65-68; Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918); Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REv. 443 (1899); Oliver*
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) [hereinaf-
tar Holmes, The Path of the Law]; Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, supra
note 30; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891). See
generally Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court: The Theorist as
Judge, in ESSAYS COMMEMORATING THE TERCENTENNIAL OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (Russell Osgood ed., 1993).
For a discussion of Holmes's development of the clear and present danger test
and the evolution of his free speech jurisprudence out of the common law of at-
tempt, see G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech
Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REV. 391 (1992).
:1 MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at
110 (1992).
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gree."" Holmes used similar language in United States v.
Winslow:39 '"ntil the one intent is nearer accomplishment...
no intent could raise the conduct to the dignity of an at-
tempt."" While Holmes generally sought to steer the general
law of attempt crimes and torts away from a purely subjective
intent basis and towards an objective standard based on con-
duct,41 his formulation has survived only in the antitrust ar-
ea.
II. FINDING HOLMES'S ANTITRUST PHILOSOPHY
Professor Neely reads these cases and the other Holmes
antitrust opinions and finds that no consistent patterns
emerge. For Professor Neely, Holmes's antitrust record cannot
accommodate "human yearning for certainty and precision" 2
and "is most usefully understood by abandoning efforts to
shape it into a consistent whole."43 Nonetheless Professor
Neely does conclude that Holmes's "interpretation left him able
to respect the will of Congress, as he saw it, without choking
on his own sense of the matter."'
I think both of these conclusions are wrong. The fact that
Holmes was erratic in the antitrust area does not mean that
clear patterns do not emerge from his judging and his private
writings. First, Holmes saw the process of combination as both
inevitable and desirable." Combination was the result of a
3 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 409 (1904).
3, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
'.' Id. at 218. Holmes had the opportunity to clarify or change his holding in
Swift, if he had so desired, in Buckeye Powder Co. v. DuPont Powder Co., 248
U.S. 55 (1918), where a losing plaintiff challenged jury instructions regarding the
distinction between monopolization and attempted monopolization. Holmes was
content to note that the instructions correctly stated that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover if the defendant's acts "were done in the course of an attempt to mo-
nopolize, whether or not they were crowned with success." Id. at 62; see also Unit-
ed States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 443 (1920); Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 387-88 (1912).
41 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 30, at 56; Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice
Holmes: Some Modern Views-The Judge as a Spectator, 31 U. CIii. L. REV. 213,
215 (1964); Comment, Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism, 84 YALE L.J. 1123
(1975).
' Neely, supra note 1, at 65.
' Id. at 64.
" Id. at 62.
' Waller, supra note 1, at 291.
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ruthless process of economic struggle which would produce
both clear winners and total losers.46 It was inconceivable to
Holmes that Congress would seek to legislate against such
irresistible forces, or that it thought that the Sherman Act
would be successful against such forces of nature.
Second, he saw the Sherman Act solely in common law
terms. From Northern Securities to his final opinions for the
Supreme Court, he interpreted the Sherman Act as the feder-
alization of the terms "restraint of trade" and "monopolization,"
as he understood those terms at common law. For Holmes,
restraints of trade were unlawful at common law for reasons
that had little to do with the preservation of competition be-
tween parties to a collusive agreement, but instead merely pre-
vented agreements to exclude a third party from a trade or
business. Thus interpreted, the Sherman Act would not affect
voluntary transfers of property even if competition was dimin-
ished or eliminated between the parties, or if buyers, consum-
ers or labor were injured as a result.
Restraints of trade at common law became an accepted
part of the legal landscape in order to enhance the value of
property rights and to promote their transfer. Holmes was
prepared to uphold restraints in connection with the creation
and transfer of property rights whenever reasonable to accom-
plish the purposes of the property owner. Thus, there was no
reason to apply the Sherman Act to consolidations and mergers
of the nature of Northern Securities. Similarly, there was no
reason to apply the Sherman Act to vertical restrictions relat-
ing to the sale of property such as in Dr. Miles.
In this regard, Holmes undoubtedly was influenced by the
way the common law had developed in Great Britain, which
Holmes both admired and followed closely. By Holmes's time,
Great Britain had eliminated completely the preservation of
competition as the underlying policy of the law of restraints of
trade.47 Cartels and related agreements often were enforced
as reasonable for the needs of the parties and society as a
whole.48 At the worst, British courts held unreasonable re-
46 Id.
'4 See generally TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BusINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT
BRITAIN AND AMERICA, 1880-1990 (1992).
' Thorsten Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., 1894
A.C. 35.
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straints unenforceable.49 Even in such cases, however, this
meant only the parties to the agreement could not invoke the
courts to compel a recalcitrant participant. There remained no
remedy for the victims of such anticompetitive behavior or for
consumers." Holmes could view the direction taken by Great
Britain, reported to him by long-time correspondent Sir Freder-
ick Pollock,51 only with a tinge of admiration and jealousy.
Holmes's common law, property-based view of the anti-
trust laws also emerged from his unique reformulations of
American common law, which consumed his scholarly writings
at all stages of his legal career. He used antitrust cases to
implement his theories of the conditionality of rights, the need
for objective standards of liability, the grounding of legal du-
ties in the contemporary needs of society, and the redefinition
of attempt crimes away from a subjective bad intent towards a
proximity to a forbidden result. Viewed in this light, cases like
Northern Securities and Swift become excellent predictors for
Holmes's future antitrust decisions, rather than the "ambigu-
ous signals"5 and "uncertain barometer" suggested by Pro-
fessor Neely.
Holmes's preferred solution to the humbug of antitrust
was equally unambiguous. He found it perfectly reasonable for
the other side of the battle to combine to engage better the
combinations of capital in an even greater conflict. Thus, labor
unions, cooperatives, and buying cartels were all perfectly
reasonable responses to the initiatives of capital.
Professor Neely correctly identifies the diverse ways that
Holmes can be viewed. Ultimately, though, he refuses to
choose among the options. Under this view, Holmes's antitrust
jurisprudence becomes a jumbled mess, but one Professor
Neely can argue is consistent with Holmes's reputation as a
deferential judge capable of enforcing legislation he found
personally repugnant. Highlighting the patterns that do exist
4' See FREYER, supra note 47, at 77-79.
to Mogul S.S. Co. v. MacGregor, Gow & Co., 1892 A.C. 25.
See, e.g., Letter from Sir Frederick Pollock to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
(Dec. 29, 1896), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES AND FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 71-72 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., 1944) (discussing Mogul S.S.) [hereinafter HOMES-POLLOCK LETTERS].
12 Neely, supra note 1, at 31.
". Id. at 34.
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unfortunately also challenge Professor Neely's conclusion as to
Holmes's deference as well.
The fact that Holmes occasionally was erratic does not
mean that he did not have a philosophy. Moreover, that he
wrote to uphold the constitutionality of the Sherman Act
meant little.54 As Professor Neely acknowledges, Holmes's
core belief was the constitutionality of economic legislation
regardless of the wisdom of the underlying policy decision. To
hold otherwise would have explicitly undermined a life's work.
Thus, to uphold the constitutionality of a statute says nothing
about the interpretation of the statute, where Holmes's consis-
tency emerged. Interpretations of the scope and jurisdiction of
the Sherman Act5 also reveal little about its central meaning.
Finally, Holmes's constitutional and interpretative opinions re-
garding state antitrust statutes56 fails to inform about the
core issue-the meaning of the federal Sherman Act. In that
critical regard, Holmes was faithful only to the preservation
and enhancement of property rights and not necessarily
Congress' intent.
Virtually all of Holmes's thinking in the antitrust area can
be traced back to his work on the common law as a scholar and
as a state court judge. For thirty years on the Supreme Court,
Holmes contended that the Sherman Act had nothing to say
about the enhancement or preservation of competition. Prior to
1914, such an interpretation was peculiar, but defensible. After
1914, however, neither Professor Neely nor Holmes should
have been able to maintain this interpretative charade. In
1914, Congress passed both the Clayton Act" and the Federal
Trade Commission Act,"8 each of which required the explicit
consideration of the effect of various restrictive business prac-
tices on competition.
Under Professor Neely's generous view of Holmes as a
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
5' See Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922);
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
"6 See McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. (1916); International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914); Central Lumber Co. v. South
Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912); Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910);
Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905).
57 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1973).
58 Id. §§ 41-46, 47-58.
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reluctant but deferential judge, this should have been a defin-
ing moment in Holmes's antitrust opinions. But it was not. If
anything, Holmes's public and private antitrust rhetoric be-
came more inflamed59 and put to rest the image of judicial re-
straint that Holmes more faithfully executed in other areas of
the law.
III. HOLMES AND MODERN ANTITRUST MOVEMENTS
A reasonably consistent Holmes antitrust philosophy
would be of little but historical interest unless it can be linked
with the issues and philosophies animating the law today.
While most of the specific holdings of Holmes's opinions do not
survive in modern doctrine, their philosophical underpinnings
remain at the center of the current debate over the purposes
and limits of antitrust today.
Professor Neely only hints at the modern relevance of
Justice Holmes to antitrust policy. While he notes some of the
links between Holmes and the Law and Economics move-
ment,6" he fails to analyze the flaws in associating Holmes's
views with the sophisticated price theory and game theory
models underlying most current economic analyses of the law.
Neely also fails to analyze the links with other modern anti-
trust movements that make Holmes an important figure for
contemporary antitrust debates.
A. The Law and Economics Movement
At a superficial level, Holmes is the father of the Law and
Economics movement usually associated with the University of
" American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502, 519-21 (1917) (Holmes dissenting and ignoring effect of passage of §
3 of the Clayton Act); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick
Pollock (Oct. 16, 1916), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS, supra note 51, at 238
(antitrust cases as "things I loathe"); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to
Sir Frederick Pollock (Nov. 17, 1914), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note
51, at 223-24 (Sherman Act "absurd"); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to
John Henry Wigmore (Nov. 1915), reprinted in Thomas A. Reed, Holmes and the
Paths of the Law, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY, 273, 291 (1993) (persons who think
universe is no longer predatory make him nauseous).
" Neely, supra note 1, at 19-21.
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Chicago. Holmes himself stated in The Path of the Law that
the legal man of the future would be the man who masters
economics.6' The connection would be more significant had
Holmes enjoyed a more profound grasp of the economics he
urged others to master.
The traditional Law and Economics view of antitrust holds
that the purpose of antitrust law is the enhancement of con-
sumer welfare through wealth maximization, and that combi-
nations between competitors, other than output-reducing price
or production restrictions, are often beneficial to consumers
and society.62 All other types of agreements generally are
viewed as either benign or affirmatively procompetitive. Law
and Economics proponents condemn antitrust rules, especially
per se rules-which go beyond the prohibition of output-reduc-
ing, price-enhancing conduct, and attack conduct with plausi-
ble efficiency justifications-as counterproductive, anti-compet-
itive and injurious to consumers.
The outcome, if not the reasoning, of Holmes's antitrust
opinions matches quite closely these views.63 As a result,
Holmes often is claimed by key figures in the Law and Eco-
nomics field as an important ancestor of the movement.' In-
"' Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 36, at 469.
62 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
' Even outside the field of antitrust, key judges within the Law and Econom-
ics movement praise and often cite with approval Holmes's views of the common
law and the social forces that animate it. For example, Judge Richard Posner
views Holmes as one of the "two greatest judges in our history," RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 292 (1988), and "the
most illustrious figure in the history of American law." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES at ix (1992). Many opinions also reflect such praise. See, e.g.,
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989); Satur-
day Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1987);
Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Country Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th
Cir. 1986); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370
(7th Cir. 1986); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210
(D.C. Cir. 1986); United Beverage Co. v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 760
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 733 F.2d
1187 (7th Cir. 1984); Marrese v. American Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d
1150 (7th Cir. 1984); Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d
119 (7th Cir. 1982); Marrese v. American Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d
1083 (7th Cir. 1982).
" On the other hand, as Professor Neely and others have noted, the same can
be said for just about every important twentieth century jurisprudential movement
that can find support in Holmes's vast body of opinions and writings. Neely, supra
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deed, in an intuitive way, Holmes does provide a precursor to
many of the themes of the Law and Economics movement
when applied to antitrust. Holmes emphasized the inevitability
and 'the desirability of most forms of combination and economic
integration;" hard competition by efficient, large-scale enter-
prise at the expense of the less efficient, smaller competitor;66
strengthening real, personal and intellectual property rights
and permitting the owner of such rights to limit contractually
rights conveyed by license;' and the toleration of vertical re-
straints given the seller's superior knowledge of marketing
opportunities and the consumer's ability to substitute other
goods and services if the vertical restrictions prove to be unde-
sirable.68
For example, more than one commentator has noted the
similarity of Holmes's position on the permissibility of resale
price maintenance to the more recent arguments of the Univer-
sity of Chicago school.69 Both Holmes and the Law and Eco-
nomics movement contend that the seller is in a superior posi-
tion to determine the best way to promote interbrand competi-
tion through price or nonprice restrictions, and that the con-
sumers have the ability to punish sellers who impose unpopu-
lar price and nonprice features by substituting other goods or
services."
note 1, at 5-6.
" International Harvester Romanty Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 233 (1913)
("if business is to go on, men must unite to do it").
66 United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); HOLMvES, THE COMMON LAW,
supra note 30, at 144-45; Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 30, at
3.
67 See Neely, supra note 1, at 53-61; Waller, supra note 1, at 298-99.
" See Neely, supra note 1, at 55-58; Waller, supra note 1, at 296.
"' David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamen-
tal Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 127
(1988); Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements: Antitrust
as History, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1013 (1985).
"o William F. Baxter, The Viability of the Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 933 (1987); Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The
Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954); Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135
(1984); Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1014,
1016; Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193 (1985); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
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Philosophically, the Law and Economics movement also
relies on Holmes's view as to the purpose of the Sherman Act
as the federalization of the common law of restraint of trade.7
This key assertion is the modern version of Holmes's conten-
tion that the Sherman Act did no more than incorporate com-
mon law terms with a distinct meaning rooted in the preserva-
tion and enhancement of property, rather than a promotion of
competitive, political, or social concerns.
Holmes emphasized a form of wealth maximization that
the Law and Economics movement has adopted as the sole goal
of antitrust policy.72 He viewed the economy as the sum of
consumption regardless of its distribution.73 Holmes expressed
these views repeatedly in both his judicial opinions74 and his
private correspondence.75
71 See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 106
(1978).
72 The Reagan Administration, which incorporated key concepts and key players
from the Law and Economics movement in both the judiciary and the Executive
Branch, strongly echoed much of Holmes's antitrust jurisprudence at a practical
level in its antitrust enforcement policy. Holmes's philosophy that size was a vir-
tue and not a vice was repeated nearly verbatim by Reagan Administration offi-
cials chanting the mantra that "bigness is not badness." ABA Antitrust Section
Examines Deregulation, Enforcement Shifts, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1224, at 156 (July 18, 1985) (Statement of then-Secretary of Commerce
Malcolm Baldrige); Nell Henderson, Baldrige Merger Plan Criticized; Changes in
Law Called Unnecessary, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1985, at F1 (Statement of then-
Assistant Attorney General J. Paul McGrath); Alex S. Jones, F.C.C. Raises Limit
on Total Stations Under One Owner, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1984, at Al (Statement
of then-F.C.C. chairman Mark Fowler); Mark Potts, The FTC, Staff Reports Shift
in Past 3 Years, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1984, at A25 (Statement of then-FTC chair-
man James C. Miller); Antitrust Chief Baxter Resigns, FACTS ON FILE WORLD
NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 23, 1983, at 966 El (Statement of then-Assistant Attorney
General William Baxter).
The language of the 1982, 1984 and 1992 Merger Guidelines, see Department
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Apr. 2,
1992, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104; 1984 U.S. Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103; 1984 U.S. Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, the now-withdrawn 1985
Vertical Restraints Guidelines, see 1985 U.S. Department of Justice Vertical Re-
straint Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,105, and the faith in the cre-
ation of efficiency through vertical restraints, joint ventures, mergers and certain
horizontal combinations all reflect a view very similar to Holmes's dissent in
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1903).
7' Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Economic Elements, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
279 (1920).
' Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900).
7 See Waller, supra note 1, at 315-17 nn.179-93 and accompanying text.
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In the end, however, the Law and Economics movement
has gone further than Holmes was ever capable of going. The
technical sophistication in the application of price theory, game
theory and the profusion of empirical analyses of antitrust
issues are a quantum leap above Holmes's rough-hewn eco-
nomic intuitions. Holmes did not share the concern of most
economically oriented antitrust scholars that true monopoly
power does have negative consequences for allocative efficiency
and societal welfare. The Law and Economics movement also
depends on fundamental assumptions of economic rationality
and utility-maximization that Holmes simply did not believe or
assimilate into his antitrust philosophy or his political econo-
my. In contrast to the assumption of the rational utility-maxi-
mizing actor underlying an economic analysis of the law,
Holmes relied on an instinctive view of the "mob" as a group of
foolish individuals incapable of understanding or satisfying
their true needs and desires.76 Ultimately, to the extent that
the Law and Economics movement has achieved coherence and
acceptance, it is not to Holmes's credit, but to those he in-
spired.
B. Holmes and Countervailing Power
Holmes's notions of political economy may have inspired
another branch of economics not directly related to the Law
and Economics movement. Holmes's preferred solution for the
economy and the antitrust laws was to embrace combination
rather than oppose it.77 In so doing, Holmes's views regarding
the inevitability and desirability of combination provide a his-
"' Id. at 320; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock
(May 25, 1906), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 51, at 123-25; Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Aug. 10, 1908), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 51, at 141; Sheldon M. Novick, Justice
Holmes's Philosophy, 70 WASH. U. L. REV. 703, 726 (1992), citing Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 10, 1916), in OLIVER
WENDELL HOLmES JR. PAPERS, (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see
also Stephen R. Diamond, Citizenship, Civilization, and Coercion: Justice Holmes
on the Taxing Power, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 115 (Rob-
ert Gordon ed., 1992). For a discussion of the shifts in nineteenth century main-
stream economics and the evolution of the consensus views underlying the anti-
trust laws, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of
Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019 (1989).
" See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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torical antecedent to theories of countervailing power most
often associated with John Kenneth Galbraith.
Galbraith first set forth a comprehensive theory of coun-
tervailing power in American Capitalism: The Concept of Coun-
tervailing Power.7" Although the concept of countervailing
power has wide-reaching consequences when applied to anti-
trust law, that does not appear to have been Galbraith's origi-
nal goal, Galbraith's American Capitalism is a historical work
that was a direct reaction to both the Great Depression, the
cataclysmic economic event of his generation, and the uneasy
prosperity that reigned in America in the decade after the end
of World War II. Galbraith discusses the inevitable consolida-
tion of the economy into giant industrial corporations79 and
the demise of the model of perfect competition as an accurate
descriptive model of the economy or an automatic mechanism
for ensuring prosperity."
Galbraith's solution to both the problem of oligopoly power
and the need to promote prosperity is the widespread develop-
ment of countervailing power and an active governmental role
in fostering and preserving such power. Galbraith argues:
The fact that a seller enjoys a measure of monopoly power, and is
reaping a measure of monopoly return as result, means that there is
an inducement to those firms from whom he buys or those to whom
he sells to develop the power with which they can defend themselves
against exploitation. It means also that there is a reward to them, in
the form of a share of the gains of their opponents' market power, if
they are able to do so. In this way the existence of market power
creates an incentive to the organization of another position of power
that neutralizes it.8
In more pithy Holmesian terms, Galbraith later states:
"[Plower on one side of a market creates both the need for, and
the prospect of reward to, the exercise of countervailing power
from the other side." 2
Galbraith contends that the creation and preservation of
78 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUN-
TERVAILING POWER (rev. ed. 1956). The original edition of AMERICAN CAPITALISM
appeared in 1952.
"' Id. at 7-8.
80 Id. at 12-17.
8! Id. at 111-12.
82 Id. at 113 (footnote omitted).
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countervailing power will promote social serenity and protect
both labor and consumers from concentration of power in in-
dustrial corporations. Gaibraith's vision of continued domestic
tranquility calls for an active federal government to create and
protect such countervailing power in labor, agricultural, and
consumer markets through unions, buying and selling coopera-
tives, and large retailers who can restrain market power at the
manufacturing level of the economy.' Galbraith would limit
antitrust policy to the attack on destructive "original" power
rather than this beneficial countervailing power."
Galbraith continues the development of his model of coun-
tervailing power in The New Industrial State,"5 arguing that
the antitrust laws are "anachronistic" and "at odds with reali-
ty."6 Galbraith contends that the antitrust laws are ineffec-
tive to the extent that they cannot adequately contend with
oligopoly, which he regards as the dominant form of industrial
organization in the American economy. 7
He also believes that the antitrust laws are pernicious,
and not merely ineffective, since they deny market power to
those who do not have it, while according substantial immuni-
ty to those already possessing it. 8" To Galbraith, the prohibi-
tion against collusive agreements between competitors provides
no constraint on large powerful corporations who do not need
to resort to such tactics to maintain market power in an
oligopolistic industry. 9
Galbraith criticizes the failure to promote countervailing
power as well as the promotion of a disguised exemption for
those firms not needing such overt tactics to increase or main-
Id. at 134-53.
Accordingly, Galbraith is quite critical of the price discrimination provisions
of the Robinson-Patman Act as attacking the wrong half of the market power
equation. Id. at 141-44.
11 JOHN KENNETH GALBRArrH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed. 1971).
e' Id. at 187-88.
8' Id. at 182-85.
, Id. at 186.
' Galbraith uses the automobile industry as an example. Through intense
study of the responses of their rivals, the three largest automobile manufacturers
can reach beneficial price and output decisions without the need for overt collusion
and are effectively immune from antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 186-87. Instead, the
antitrust laws prohibit the type of direct agreement that would be necessary for
small parts suppliers to cooperate in exerting countervailing power against the
manufacturers. Id.
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tain market power. Galbraith carries this theme to its logical
conclusion in Economics and the Public Purpose," where he
proposes a general exemption for small business from all anti-
trust prohibitions against combinations to stabilize price and
output.
91
Outside of providing support for the existing labor92 and
agricultural cooperative exemptions93 to the antitrust laws,
Galbraith's countervailing power theory has played little role
in the development of antitrust case law. This is not altogether
surprising since Galbraith primarily was interested in the
reform of the antitrust laws only as a secondary goal to pre-
venting the recurrence of the Great Depression, which was the
unforgettable economic catastrophe of his generation.
The weakness of Galbraith's theory as a unifying principle
for competition policy also helps explain its relative dormancy.
The theory itself is subject to two serious theoretical criticisms,
which Galbraith only partially acknowledges. First, counter-
vailing powers theories cannot accurately predict the outcomes
of bargaining between two groups possessing bilateral monopo-
ly power. The outcome is normally indeterminate.'
Second, Galbraith fails to acknowledge fully the many
circumstances in which two parties to a negotiation can reach
an outcome that benefits both to the disadvantage of a third
party. Such negotiations are no longer zero sum games where
one side gains in proportion to the other side's losses. They are
instead non-zero sum games where both sides can "win" by
91 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973).
9' Id. at 256.
92 15 U.S.C. §§ 17 & 52 (1973).
93 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1980).
9' Galbraith attempts to distinguish countervailing power from bilateral mo-
nopoly by stating:
[I] have rejected the terminology of bilateral monopoly in character-
izing this phenomenon. As bilateral monopoly is treated in economic
literature, it is an adventitious occurrence. This, obviously, misses the
point and it is one of the reasons that the investigations of bilateral
monopoly, which one would have thought might have been an avenue to
the regulatory mechanisms here isolated, have in fact been a blind alley.
However, this line of investigation has also been sterilized by the confin-
ing formality of the assumptions of monopolistic and (more rarely)
oligopolistic motivation and behavior with which it has been ap-
proached. ...
GALBRAITH, supra note 78, at 113 n.2.
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passing off losses to some group or individual not part of the
negotiation. Galbraith does concede that wage negotiations
between labor and capital in times of high demand can produce
such a result and lead to serious inflation,95 but fails to real-
ize the other opportunities for such behavior in the economy or
where one side can wrest concessions from the other, enjoy the
fruits of the concession, but not pass them along to the constit-
uency ostensibly represented.
Most recently, notions of countervailing power have ap-
peared as a defense in merger litigation under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. Section 7 bars mergers and acquisitions that may
tend to lessen substantially competition or create a monopoly
in a relevant product and geographic market.9 Some courts
have begun to focus on the existence of "power buyers" as proof
of a lack of any tendency to affect competition adversely. Un-
der this rationale, the existence of powerful buyers would ne-
gate the newly merged firm from raising price and restricting
output and, therefore, indicate that the merger would not have
the tendency to injure competition.97 While an increasing
number of courts have been willing to entertain such argu-
ments in both merger9 and non-merger cases,99 the theory
can be criticized on exactly the same grounds as the general
theories of countervailing power, which form the background
for the power buyer rationale."0 Theories of countervailing
power have also surfaced in the various health care reform
Id. at 133-34.
96 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1973).
"7 United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
"8 Id.; United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D.
Iowa 1991); United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669 (D.
Minn. 1990); F.T.C. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T
69,239 (D.D.C. 1990); see also Mary Lou Steptoe, The Power-Buyer Defense in
Merger Cases, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 493 (1993).
"' United States v. Syufy Enter., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990); National Cable
Television Ass'n v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1991); R.C.
Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Cal. 1985);
see also Michael S. Jacobs, The New Sophistication in Antitrust, 79 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1994).
" Because of these weaknesses, few have attempted systematically to apply
notions of countervailing power to general antitrust jurisprudence. One scholar who
attempted such a synthesis working from a traditional Law and Economic's per-
spective is Professor Barbara Ann White. Barbara Ann White, Countervailing Pow-
er- Different Rules for Different Markets? Conduct and Context in Antitrust Law
and Economics, 1992 DUKE L.J. 1045.
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packages proposed by the Clinton Administration and by mem-
bers of Congress.'' While such theories often are criticized
and viewed as outside the antitrust mainstream, it is the theo-
ry of countervailing power, and not the Law and Economics
movement, which is the modern and more direct offspring and
legacy of Holmes's embrace of combination.
C. The Modern Antitrust Abolitionists
Another modern Holmesian offspring is the loose coalition
of critics on both the right and the left seeking the outright
abolition of the antitrust laws. There is a striking similarity of
Holmes's views of the futility of antitrust law with the more ad
hoc movement, which has argued that the United States anti-
trust laws are a luxury that we can no longer afford in interna-
tional trade matters. While the rationales advanced differ
among the antitrust abolitionists, they all echo Holmes's char-
acterization of the antitrust laws as dangerous nonsense.0 2
The principal academic advocate of abolition has been
Lester Thurow.' °3 Over the past dozen years, the abolition of
antitrust has become a major theme of Thurow's writings and
his role as policy adviser to segments of the Democratic Party.
Thurow's attacks on the antitrust laws began as a relatively
minor digression in his 1980 book The Zero Sum Society."4
Thurow principally sought to address the problems of skyrock-
eting energy costs and shortages, slow economic growth and
101 The details of the competing health care plans are compared in Ann M.
Murphy & Richard H. Sanders, Appendix: Major Health System Reform Proposals
Comparative Analysis, 27 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 15 (1994).
12 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Nov. 7,
1914), in 3 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 51, at 223; Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Apr. 23, 1910), in 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 51, at 163; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
to Sir Frederick Pollock (May 25, 1906), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra
note 51, at 123-25; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein
(Aug. 1, 1908), in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS (James Bishop Peabody ed.,
1964); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (Aug. 1, 1908), in
THE HOLMES-EINsTEIN LETTERS, supra, at 39-41.
10 While Thurow may be the most prominent modern abolitionist, he is by no
means alone. For an extreme Law and Economics argument for the abolition of
the antitrust laws with libertarian and natural law overtones, see DOMINICK T.
ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE (2d ed.
1990); DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986).
104 LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY (1980).
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inflation which simultaneously plagued the United States in a
particularly virulent fashion in the 1970s. Thurow argued that
these problems are all essentially zero sum games whose solu-
tions required making some segment of society worse off in
order to make another segment better off. He suggested that
the United States political system was ill-suited to addressing
directly the distributional aspects of government economic
policies and, instead, disguised those distributional choices in
subsidies, regulations, tax policy, and protectionism.
Thurow proposed an explicit recognition of distributional
aims and goals and that "all economic solutions require deci-
sions about the distribution of income."" 5 In order to imple-
ment his own normative vision, Thurow proposed an abolition
of protectionism, regulations and subsidies that prevent the
deployment of assets to more productive means. He further
suggested that the government take a more active role in pro-
moting disinvestment in relatively unproductive sectors, direct-
ing investment in more productive economic sectors, and di-
rectly compensating those individuals made worse off by these
choices.
The attack on antitrust is all the more curious since it
appeared as a collateral issue in a chapter entitled "Spreading
Rules and Regulations,""' and barely figured in any of his
policy prescriptions.' Thurow contended that the antitrust
laws are outmoded in light of the realities of world competition
and that the focus on price competition and big case structural
antitrust litigation is ineffective or counterproductive.'
Thurow ultimately suggested abolishing international trade
barriers as an alternative to continued reliance on an antitrust
system that he characterizes as "not applicable in getting
ready for the twenty-first century."' Thurow subsequently
has reiterated and expanded his attacks on antitrust, particu-
larly in his more popular writings in newspapers and maga-
zines, in which he tends to feature antitrust more prominently
as a danger to the United States' prosperity."0
IC' Id. at 213.
1 Id. at 144-50.
o Id. at 210.
1C8 Id. at 125-27.
1t9 Id. at 145.
11 Lester C. Thurow, Should Institutional Investors Revolt?, FORTUNE, June 17,
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Thurow's rhetoric initially appears to leave room for a
narrow version of antitrust law not that far removed from that
proposed by the Law and Economics movement. Thurow states
in The Zero Sum Society:
Given our modem economic environment, antitrust regulations
should be stripped back to two basic propositions. the first would be
a ban on predatory pricing. Large firms should not be allowed to
drive small firms out of business by selectively lowering their prices
in submarkets while they maintain high prices in other submarkets.
The second proposition would be a ban on explicit or implicit cartels
that share either markets or profits. Firms can grow by driving
competitors out of business or by absorbing them, but they cannot
agree not to compete with each other."1
Even this cramped and limited vision of the antitrust laws
proves to be illusory. Thurow defines market power in such a
way that it can never exist. Thurow contends that market
power does not exist in markets for luxury goods where con-
sumers are really choosing between an unlimited choice of
items like vacation homes, swimming pools and Rolls
Royces."' On the opposite end of the economic spectrum, he
also contends that no firm can earn supracompetitive profits
for items like breakfast cereal, given the unlimited choices of
breakfast alternatives.' Finally, Thurow expansively defines
potential competition as the ultimate check on market power
through the activity of sophisticated financial conglomerates
searching for excessive rates of return as the basis of their
investment decisions.1
4
Under such a system, there is no reason ever to take ac-
tion under the antitrust laws, or to preserve them at all. Un-
der Thurow's assumptions, no predatory conduct or collusive
agreement would be likely to succeed, and no injury to consum-
ers would ever ensue. In Thurow's world, the costs of antitrust
1991, at 131; Lester C. Thurow, A World Class Economy: Getting Back in the
Ring, TECH. REV., Aug. 1985; Lester C. Thurow, Is Our Economy Strangled by Our
Laws, INC., June 1981, at 16; Lester C. Thurow, Let's Abolish the Antitrust Laws,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1980, § 3, at 2; Thurow versus Guilder: A Debate, NEWS-
WEEK, May 4, 1981, at 63; Antitrust Grows UnPopular, BUS. WK., Jan. 12, 1981,
at 90.
. THUROW, supra note 104, at 150.
1 Id. at 147.
1 Id.
m Id. at 147-48.
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enforcement will inevitably outweigh any benefits, which, by
his definition, are next to zero.115
Regardless of the correctness of Thurow's analysis, 116 he
is certainly not alone in his antitrust views. The fear and
loathing of antitrust has always been a staple of the business
community. From the inception of the Sherman Act, the anti-
trust laws have been condemned on a variety of moral, eco-
nomic, and libertarian grounds. Most recently, the business
community has focused on the antitrust laws as an important
cause of the lack of international "competitiveness" of United
States firms, the supposed advantage of foreign firms without
such restrictions on their behavior, and the trade deficit it-
self.11
7
These views found favor in both the Reagan and Bush
administrations. Among the most outspoken champions of this
point of view have been the senior officials of the United States
Department of Commerce and, in particular, the late Secretary
of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, who contended that the anti-
trust laws should be either reformed or eliminated in order to
allow the United States to compete successfully in world markets."'
... Id. at 127.
... See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The "New Learning" and the Eutha-
nasia of Antitrust, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1516 (1986); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A.
Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From?
Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 937 (1987); Robert G. Harris & Lawrence
A. Sullivan, Horizontal Merger Policy: Promoting Competition and American Com-
petitiveness, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 871 (1986).
"" Adams & Brock, supra note 116, at 1518-20.
1.8 See Malcolm Baldrige, Leading the Way to 2000, 10 BUS. AM. May 11, 1987,
at 7 (supporting relaxation of antimerger laws); Study Shows Low-Value Imports
Responsible for U.S. Telecommunications Trade Deficit, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1309 (Aug. 22, 1990) (recommending reforming antitrust laws to assist U.S. com-
petitiveness); High-Tech, Computer Literacy, Deregulation Called Crucial for U.S.
Survival in Trade, 3 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 825 (June 25, 1986) (Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce calling for revision of antitrust laws to promote capital forma-
tion and increased trade); Baldrige Says Trade Deficit Outlook for 1986 is
"Clouded," Could Be About the Same as 1985, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 301 (Mar.
5, 1986) (Secretary of Commerce discussing need to make antitrust laws "compati-
ble with today's world"); Administration Unveils Reform Package Aimed at Revised
Import Relief, Foreign Trade Law, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 268 (Feb. 6, 1986);
Customs-F.A.S. Deficit For November Expands $12.3 Billion, Commerce Department
Reports, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 62 (Jan. 8, 1986) (Secretary of Commerce
Baldrige urging updating antitrust laws); August Merchandise Trade Deficit Nar-
rows as Imports Decline, Exports Hold Steady, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1241 (Oct.
2, 1985) (Secretary of Commerce Baldrige requesting presidential review of out-
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Congress also has traditionally expressed concern that the
antitrust laws have hindered United States firms in achieving
full technological innovation and true competitiveness in ex-
port markets. As early as 1918, Congress passed the Webb-
Pomerene Act allowing United States to create export associa-
tions with their competitors to counter the perceived influence
of foreign cartels and government-owned industries."' But by
1982, Webb-Pomerene associations were perceived as an inade-
quate tool of export promotion.2 ' Congress modified and
weakened the antitrust laws in two additional ways to assist
United States companies engaged in international trade. Con-
gress changed both the jurisdictional requirements for applying
the antitrust laws to agreements relating to exports12 ' and
created a certification procedure whereby firms could receive
immunity from government prosecution and limitation of pri-
vate suits to single damages,122 again in the belief that the
antitrust laws were a principal cause of the inability to com-
pete in international markets."
moded aspects of antitrust laws); High Tech Frontier, The MacNeil-Lehrer
NewsHour, June 26, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library Transcript File
(statements of Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher recommending easing of antitrust
laws to aid U.S. competitiveness in world markets); cf White House Briefing, FED.
NEWS SERV., Sept. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Curnws Library, Fednews File
(discussing more nuanced modifications of antitrust law in Clinton Administration's
plan for reinventing government) (available on Lexis).
119 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1973).
12 Webb-Pomerene Associations never achieved widespread acceptance in the
marketplace in part because of the limitations in the scope of the immunity con-
ferred by the Act. The Webb-Pomerene Act applies solely to the export of goods
and not services. Also, the Act requires a degree of disclosure and scrutiny by the
Federal Trade Commission, which deterred certain exporters. See id. §§ 61-65. The
scope of Webb-Pomerene immunity has been further restricted by judicial interpre-
tation. See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947
(D. Mass. 1950).
Two studies conducted by the Federal Trade Commission have confirmed the
limited impact of the Webb-Pomerene Act. A 1977 study showed a gradually de-
clining number of both registered and active associations. The vast majority of the
associations were short-lived, had between 2 and 16 members and were shrinking
in size. While Webb-Pomerene Associations accounted for 2.3% of export trade in
1962, they accounted for only 1.5% of export trade in 1976. But see International
Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 898 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1990) (granting
immunity under Webb-Pomerene for joint operation of terminal facility), on re-
mand, 767 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
... 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1973).
1 Id. § 4013.
" See Spencer Weber Waller, The Failure of the Export Trading Company Pro-
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Similarly, Congress has relaxed the antitrust laws regard-
ing joint ventures. Congress passed the National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984 ("NCRA") at the request of the Reagan
Administration to clarify further the antitrust laws.124 The
Act mandates the application of a full rule-of-reason analysis
to antitrust claims involving joint research and develop-
ment."= The Act also permits persons to register a research
and development joint venture with the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission in return for reducing the
risk of treble damage liability.2 6 Conduct properly described
in a registration is judged under the rule of reason.'27 If the
conduct in a registration is found to violate the rule of reason,
the defendant is liable only for actual, rather than treble, dam-
ages. "' A prevailing defendant is entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees if the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, with-
out foundation, or in bad faith.2 9 Most recently, the NRCA
has been amended to expand these protections to most produc-
tion joint ventures as well.'
gram, 17 N.C. J. INTL L. & COMl. REG. 239 (1992).
124 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (Supp. 1994).
12 while the Act defines joint research and development venture broadly, id. §
4301(b)(6), it is not applicable to production joint ventures and specifically excludes
from its protection the exchange of information not reasonably required for re-
search and development. Id. § 4301(b)(1). The Act further does not apply to any
agreements regarding the production or marketing of the results of the joint ven-
ture other than the protection of the intellectual rights necessary to protect the
research and development itself. Id. § 4301(b)(2).
128 Id. § 4305. A person wishing to register such an agreement with Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission must do so within ninety days
of the formation of the joint venture. The notification must disclose the identities
of the participants and the nature and objectives of the joint venture. The parties
must file an additional notification within ninety days if the participants change.
The parties may file additional notifications if the nature or membership of the
joint venture is changed. Id. § 4305(a).
The government remains free to investigate or challenge a joint venture regis-
tered pursuant to the Act. A private party may sue for treble damages for unlaw-
ful conduct outside the scope of the registration. A private party also may sue for
actual damages under the Act for conduct that is covered in the registration. The
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission neither approve the joint
venture nor certify that the notified conduct is covered by the Act. The protections
of the Act are determined only if the joint venture is later challenged on antitrust
grounds.
12 Id. § 4302.
128 Id. § 4303.
12' Id. § 4304 (Supp. 1994). The attorney fees section is not dependant on notifi-
cation of the joint venture.
12' The National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
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History suggests that during a period of rising trade defi-
cits, this pattern of fragmentation will continue with the anti-
trust laws being progressively weakened to support a variety of
claims, both specious and valid, regarding the necessities of
the international business world and the "competitiveness" of
the United States within that system. Holmes and the modern
abolitionists share the uncertainty of bad economic times.
Antitrust as villain typically appears at the nation's economic
low points. These themes tend to fade away, but never disap-
pear, in times of expansion when output-restricting agree-
ments are most pernicious in terms of consumer welfare and
economic opportunity, and other social goals appear less press-
ing.
CONCLUSION
Holmes's reputation in the antitrust arena stands in
marked distinction to his towering reputation in other areas of
the law. Antitrust casebooks feature his dissents primarily as
historical oddities, and scholarly analysis until now has been
scant. Professor Neely and I disagree about much regarding
Justice Holmes and the antitrust laws. I am certainly not the
first critic of the greatness of Justice Holmes's contribution to
a particular area of the law.131 What is important is that Jus-
tice Holmes's work in antitrust finally is receiving its proper
and long overdue attention.
His views regarding the inevitability and efficacy of combi-
nation and cooperation among competitors resonate in modern
day arguments regarding Law and Economics, countervailing
power, industrial policy, international trade, and modern world
markets. Holmes's view of the specifics of antitrust doctrine
may be idiosyncratic and out of touch with the mainstream,
but the policy behind these decisions has a decidedly modern
ring in times of economic uncertainty.
As the cycle of antitrust continues, undoubtedly such
views eventually will retreat as the current trauma of the
42, 107 Stat. 117.
131 See Waller, supra note 1, at 327; G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of
Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (1971); see also MILTON HANDLER, ANTi-
TRUST IN PERSPECTIVE: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF RULE AND DISCRETION 13-
17 (1957).
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economic system ends and the system comes to depend on
principles of free competition and trade. However, such ideals
will surface again as turbulent and changing times resurrect
the call for size, cooperation, and a system with a focus on
other values besides the enhancement of the competitive pro-
cess.

